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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of configuring mobile devices to
receive broadcast services protected by legacy conditional access sys-
tems. The protocols apply the concepts of trusted computing to allow
a mobile host to demonstrate that it is secure, before any application
or associated keys are securely downloaded. Thus the protocols are
applicable anywhere a secure download is required. A general analysis
of the security of the protocols is presented, followed by the results of
formal verification.
1 Introduction
Recent developments in communications systems have given mobile devices
the potential to receive complex multimedia content. It is expected that the
next generation of mobile devices will be able to collaborate with broadcast
networks to enable mobile access to broadcast content [1]. For a service
like this to achieve its full commercial potential, the owners of the content
will require assurance that their material is not illegally accessed. Current
broadcast systems accomplish this by using conditional access systems to
ensure that only bona fide subscribers have access to the content.
Each broadcast network is free to choose from a large number of commer-
cially available conditional access systems. However, the security mechanisms
and algorithms used by these systems are proprietary, and closely guarded
by the system provider. Therefore, receivers may not switch freely between
broadcast networks. This inflexibility presents an impediment to the recep-
tion of broadcast content by mobile receivers.
Standards exist that define an interface to proprietary systems at both the
transmission site and at the receiver [2–5]. These standards were designed to
give consumers and broadcasters some flexibility in their choice of equipment,
and, while receivers remain static and consumers subscribe to one or two
service providers, they provide a practical solution to this problem.
However, if a mobile subscriber requires access to services protected by
a range of conditional access systems, then the current solutions become
impractical. This paper proposes a flexible approach that allows consumer
products to support a wide range of proprietary content protection systems.
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2 Background
The Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) organisation1 has defined standards
specifying two mechanisms to provide a degree of flexibility in the application
of proprietary conditional access (CA) systems to broadcast services [2]. At
the transmission site, the simulcrypt standard [3] allows a service to be con-
trolled by two or more conditional access systems. At the receiver, the com-
mon interface standard [4] allows conditional access modules to be plugged
into pc-card slots in the receiver to configure the device for the required con-
ditional access system. Both systems rely on the service being scrambled
using a standard common scrambling algorithm [5].
In the DVB system a service is scrambled using the common scrambling
algorithm (CSA) under a key known as the control word (CW ). Other sys-
tems use proprietary scrambling algorithms. However, in all cases the crypto-
graphic scheme is a symmetric algorithm, and consequently the control word
must be delivered to the receiver in a secure manner. This is the function of
the conditional access system. At the transmission site, the control word is
encrypted by the conditional access system and the encrypted control word
E(CW ), or Entitlement Management Message (ECM), is broadcast to the
receiver in advance of the scrambled service. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
2.1 Simulcrypt
If a second conditional access system is available to the broadcaster, then the
same control word may also be encrypted by this system. The simulcrypt
standard [3], illustrated in Fig. 2, describes the interface to the conditional
access systems. Both encrypted control words are then broadcast in advance
1www.dvb.org
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of the scrambled service. Thus, receivers running either conditional access
system are able to decipher the control word and access the scrambled ser-
vice. As far as the consumer is concerned, the operation of this system is
completely transparent. The service provider, however, must operate multi-
ple conditional access systems.
While it may be commercially feasible for large networks to operate two or
three conditional access systems, the cost and logistics of running many such
systems simultaneously could prove to be prohibitive for smaller networks.
2.2 Common interface
A parallel means of supporting multiple CA systems is to provide a solution
at the receiver. This is accomplished by specifying a standard interface at
the receiver that provides access to the scrambled service and the encrypted
control words [4]. Fig. 3 shows how the scrambled service and the encrypted
control word are passed to a separate pc-card module containing the hardware
and software for a specific conditional access system. The encrypted control
words are deciphered on the module to provide access to the service.
By swapping modules, the receiver can thus be configured to match the
conditional access system used by the broadcaster. This system is therefore
transparent to the broadcaster but not the subscriber. As is the case with
simulcrypt, this mechanism may provide a solution for two or three condi-
tional access systems, but, as the numbers increase, the cost to the subscriber
could become prohibitive.
2.3 Limitations of existing mechanisms
The current solutions are well suited to current technology, where services are
generally controlled by one or two conditional access systems and subscribers
generally only require authorisation from one or two broadcasters. With
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a mobile receiver, however, subscribers will require authorisation from an
increasing number of service providers as they move around.
The common interface solution would require mobile devices to have a pc-
card interface and require the user to carry a number of modules. The cost of
adding such an interface as well as the practical design issues could make this
infeasible. The cost of the modules may also deter some subscribers. The
alternative solution using current technology would be to broadcast each ser-
vice under the control of as many conditional access systems as possible,
which would prove expensive for many broadcasters, especially those operat-
ing in small niche markets. Both current solutions therefore have potential
difficulties which could significantly restrict the content available to mobile
receivers. These existing solutions do not transfer well to mobile systems and
the problem of providing flexible conditional access would benefit therefore
from some reconsideration in the light of new requirements.
2.4 Modifications required for mobile receivers
The goal is to provide access controlled broadcast content to mobile devices.
This should be achieved with minimum impact on existing networks while at
the same time minimising the hardware overhead on the mobile device and
the cost to the user. An attractive solution is to allow a mobile receiver to be
re-configured to be compatible with the appropriate proprietary conditional
access system. The implication of this is that the proprietary application is
implemented in software and delivered to the mobile device on demand.
The difficulty lies in convincing the software provider that the application,
including any embedded secret keys, will be protected to at least the level
offered by current solutions. This contrasts with the more familiar problem
of securing the platform against malicious applications.
To address this problem, the delivery mechanism must protect both the
integrity and confidentiality of the application. Moreover, the mobile device
must be able to demonstrate to the software provider that the platform on
which the application will execute is trustworthy. The former can be accom-
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plished by well known security mechanisms such as encryption and the use
of message authentication codes [6], while the latter may be achieved by the
deployment of emerging trusted computing technologies. This is what we are
proposing in this paper and the remaining sections describe the technologies
used, the protocols to implement secure download, and an analysis of the
security of these protocols.
3 Enabling standards and technologies
To provide a platform with the ability to prove its configuration to a chal-
lenger, and prove that it can be trusted to maintain that configuration, is a
major research challenge. This challenge is being addressed by industrial and
academic research groups and the principal results are described in this sec-
tion. The suitability of these results for use in resolving the specific problems
described in the previous section is also assessed.
3.1 The Trusted Computing Group
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [7], is an industry forum which is de-
veloping standards for a trusted computing platform. The platform specified
by the TCG incorporates three fundamental components.
The first of these components is a Core Root of Trust for Measure-
ment (CRTM) [8–10]. This component has the ability to measure one or
more integrity metrics which reflect a portion of the software environment of
the platform. These integrity metrics are recorded in one of sixteen Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs), located in the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM).
The second component, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [8–10],
is a tamper-resistant component responsible for recording and reporting the
integrity metrics measured by the CRTM. The TPM also provides security
functionality to the platform, such as platform attestation and protected and
sealed storage.
The third fundamental component of a TCG compliant trusted platform
is the TCG Software Stack (TSS) [11]. This is software on a trusted plat-
form which supports the TPM. The TSS supports a stored measurement log,
in which a record of all platform software that has been measured is stored.
In conjunction with the stored measurement log, the TSS provides the func-
tionality to support measurement agents and a trusted platform agent [12].
The measurement agents have similar functionality to that of the CRTM.
They perform integrity measurements, but they do not constitute a root of
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trust. The measurement agents must, therefore, be measured by the CRTM
before they can be trusted and run. The trusted platform agent co-ordinates
the supply of integrity metrics to challengers, i.e. third parties who wish to
be given assurance regarding the current state of the trusted platform.
An important security service offered by a TCG compliant trusted plat-
form is authenticated boot. During this boot process, the software state of
the platform is measured and recorded in the Platform Configuration Regis-
ters in the TPM. For the problem addressed by this paper, we also make use
of the platform attestation mechanism. This permits the state of the trusted
platform’s software configuration to be demonstrated to a challenger. To
accomplish this, the TPM signs PCR values representative of the current
state of the platform and, optionally, any external data provided as an input
parameter to the attestation instruction.
TCG compliant platforms also provide confidentiality and integrity pro-
tection for stored keys, data, and application code. This is accomplished
using the protected storage mechanism. In this instance, any binary object
may be encrypted under a key which is itself protected in a key hierarchy.
The root of this key hierarchy, the storage root key, is embedded in the
tamper-resistant TPM.
Further protection is provided by a mechanism called sealing. Sealing
associates an arbitrary binary object with specific PCR values (cumulative
digests of software running on the platform) before encrypting the object.
The encrypted object cannot subsequently be retrieved unless the current
PCR values, representing the current software environment of the platform,
match the required PCR ‘digest at release’ associated with the object. Input
of correct authorisation data may also be required before access to the binary
object is permitted.
3.2 Next Generation Secure Computing Base
In parallel with the Trusted Computing Group, Microsoft is developing the
Next Generation Secure Computing Base, or NGSCB [13,14]. Although de-
tails of the NGSCB specifications remain unpublished, Microsoft have pro-
duced technical reports [15–17] that provide an insight into the proposed
architecture. NGSCB mandates the presence of a Security Support Compo-
nent (SSC) which may be implemented by the TCG’s version 1.2 compliant
TPM. NGSCB also requires modifications to be made to the CPU, memory
controller, graphics adaptor, and keyboard.
The NGSCB architecture incorporates three fundamental components,
the first being a Root Of Trust For Measurement, similarly to the
TCG’s CRTM. Again, similar to the TCG, the second component is a Se-
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curity Support Component or ‘SSC’. This is a tamper-resistant chip re-
quired to provide cryptographic processing, a small amount of memory, and a
monotonic counter. A module compliant with version 1.2 of the TCG’s TPM
specifications [8–10] is expected to serve as a potential SSC in the NGSCB
architecture.
The Isolation Kernel is the third component. This enables several oper-
ating systems to execute in parallel on the same machine, and controls access
to system resources. Through the deployment of the isolation kernel, mass
market operating systems may be run in parallel to, but isolated from, one
or more high assurance components (HACs). These high assurance compo-
nents were previously known as ‘nexuses’, and are where trusted applications,
previously called nexus computing agents (NCAs), are hosted.
The security services offered by the NGSCB architecture include confiden-
tiality and integrity protection of stored data and applications. This is pro-
vided using the sealed storage mechanism offered by the NGSCB commands
Seal/Unseal and PKSeal/PKUnseal [18]. The sealing mechanism ensures
that a particular binary object is only accessible to the trusted application
that created it, running on a specific instance of a particular HAC, or to a
trusted application specifically permitted by the creator to have access to it.
NGSCB also provides attestation through the Quote command. This
command instructs the SCC to sign a set of integrity metrics and, optionally,
any external data provided as an input parameter to the command [18].
Secure input/output facilities are also provided by NGSCB, in which only
trusted applications have access to input and output operations. These op-
erations, therefore, cannot be observed or modified by any other processes.
In a fundamental sense, in order to implement the above service, hardware
changes to input and output devices are not strictly necessary. In principle,
the isolation kernel could give control of the keyboard and the graphics card
to a piece of trusted code, thus guaranteeing that input and output will not
be observed or corrupted. There are two reasons, however, why new hard-
ware for input and graphics is desirable. The first reason is to minimise the
size of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which should ideally be kept as
small as possible to preserve security. The second reason is is to maintain
performance and ease of running off-the-shelf legacy operating systems which
expect to have direct access to the graphics card. Although Virtual Machine
Monitors (VMMs) routinely solve this problem by exposing a virtual graph-
ics card to their guest operating systems, in practice this solution results in
significant performance degradation.
Another important aspect of the NGSCB architecture is its memory pro-
tection mechanisms. The protected operating environment isolates secure
areas of memory that are used to process data with high security require-
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ments. These memory protection mechanisms are facilitated by the isolation
kernel, using a page table edit control (PTEC) algorithm [18]. The memory
controller or chipset must also be specially designed to provide protection
against Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks.
CPU modifications allow the newly designed isolation kernel to execute in
a new ring, ring -1. This permits the execution of legacy operating systems
with few modifications. It also means that problems usually associated with
virtualising operating system instruction sets may be avoided.
To meet these needs, Intel’s LaGrande Technology (LT) project [19] has
developed a set of hardware components, including a processor and chipset
extensions, keyboard, mouse and graphic subsystem enhancements and a
TCG version 1.2 compliant TPM. These components will support an Intel
architecture 32-bit platform that is able to provide the security services de-
scribed above, such as protected execution (including prevention of DMA
attacks), sealed storage, and platform attestation.
3.3 Open source architectures
In addition to the major trusted computing initiatives outlined above, parallel
developments are taking place in the open source community. For example,
the PERSEUS project [20] proposes a new architecture for a trusted platform
which uses TCG/NGSCB hardware features in conjunction with an open
source security kernel [21]. Marchessini et al. [22] also describe experiments
where TCG hardware has been used to transform a desktop Linux machine
into a virtual secure processor.
Two alternative architectures that may meet our objectives are the AEGIS
processor architecture [23], and the executable only memory (XOM) archi-
tecture [24]. Both these projects propose architectures developed around
security hardened processors.
3.4 Application to secure downloads
Balacheff et al. [12] and Sadeghi and Stu¨ble [21] have both highlighted the
potential of the TCG architecture for the secure delivery to and storage
of content on, a trusted platform. Their schemes use a challenge-response
mechanism so that the challenger (in our application the software provider)
can be certain that the mobile host can indeed be trusted. The schemes then
require encryption of the application by the software provider so that it is
only retrievable by the platform that has been proven trustworthy.
There are, however, potential issues which arise with a trusted platform
that deploys only the mechanisms described by the TCG. The main issue is
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that there are no mechanisms described by the TCG to partition the sys-
tem into trusted and untrusted environments, nor is there any mention of
trusted operating systems or applications which may exist within these envi-
ronments. On the face of it, one could take this to imply that the ‘protected
execution environment’ we speak of encompasses the entire platform. Conse-
quently, platform use could become very restricted. If the platform state is
to be considered trustworthy, the challenger may insist that only a specific
operating system and limited set of applications are running.
If platform use is to remain unrestricted, the challenger could be faced
with the task of verifying a large set of complex integrity metrics. It is
clear from the way PCR values are calculated that verification of an integrity
challenge could become a difficult and overly complex task. In particular,
this may become a problem if a challenged platform has been running for
a long time, resulting in a large number of entries in the trusted platform
measurement store. Verification may also be particularly complex if many
different validation entities are being used by the challenged platform to
certify the entries in the software measurement log.
Further problems arise if the host platform has deployed extensible soft-
ware. PCR values should reflect every piece of software running on the
trusted platform, and a PCR value containing the integrity metric for a piece
of extensible software would therefore be very difficult to verify as ‘correct’
or trustworthy. The integrity mechanism deployed by the TCG specifications
may ultimately mean that a very large number of different software states
may have to be verified, which may be impractical.
A question also arises in relation to the protection of binary objects after
they have been unsealed. When an application is unsealed we must consider
the threats it may be exposed to during execution, for example tampering or
replication.
Finally, there exists the possibility that malicious software may penetrate
the system and bypass the operating system kernel via DMA. In this way,
applications that have been measured by the CRTM may be overwritten by
malicious code. Therefore, during platform attestation, a false impression of
the software environment may be given to a challenger.
To overcome these limitations, the protocols proposed in sections 4.5 and
4.6 are based on a combination of the security mechanisms offered by NGSCB,
LT hardware extensions, and the CRTM and TPM as defined by the TCG.
This combination of security mechanisms is being proposed here for a number
of reasons.
The CRTM and the TPM described in the TCG specifications are well
defined, in the public domain, and have undergone a review process leading
to the recent release of version 1.2 of the main TPM specification [8–10].
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They facilitate authenticated boot, secure storage and platform attestation.
Memory protection mechanisms provided by the NGSCB isolation kernel
and LT hardware extensions guarantee that the downloaded application can
execute without interference or without external monitoring. By implement-
ing an isolation kernel, as described by Microsoft, trusted partitions can be
separated from the untrusted system partitions. Thus any legacy operating
system and any untrusted applications may still run in parallel to trusted
applications. The extra ring (ring -1) allows these memory protection mech-
anisms to be implemented in an efficient manner. Furthermore, the process
of platform attestation or software integrity verification also becomes much
simpler. The LT chipset extensions can prohibit system vulnerabilities caused
by physical attacks (DMA) bypassing the integrity measuring mechanisms.
Therefore, in defining the protocols which follow, we assume that the
trusted computing technology described above is available on the mobile
host. This platform ideally consists of a TPM and CRTM as described in
[8–10]; additional hardware extensions as described in [15–17] and [19]; and
an isolation kernel as described in [18]. This will then enable the problem
of securely downloading the conditional access application to be tackled, as
described below.
4 Trusted download protocols
Having identified technology with the potential to solve the problem of prov-
ing that a platform is trustworthy, we now address the challenge of securing
a downloaded conditional access application. Our two objectives are:
1. To protect the confidentiality and integrity of the application as it is
transported from the software provider to the host platform.
2. To protect the application when it executes and is stored on the host
platform.
4.1 Model
The model under consideration is illustrated in Fig. 4 and involves three
parties: the user, who has a mobile receiver, M ; the broadcaster, B; and the
software provider, S.
4.1.1 Overview
The mobile user does not have a long term relationship with the broadcaster,
but is aware of the services that are available. Some of these services may be
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scrambled, in which case access is controlled by a conditional access system.
For each scrambled service, the associated conditional access application,
AC , must be acquired by the mobile receiver. The protocol requires that
the mobile receiver is able to demonstrate to the software provider that it
is a bona fide receiver and is not in a malicious state that may attempt to
illegally modify or replicate the downloaded application or keys. Once the
receiver has proved itself to be legitimate, the application is made available
only to that receiver. The protocol must then protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the application as it is transported to the mobile device. Finally,
the application must be protected on the platform itself.
The software provider in this model is required to supply the appropriate
conditional access software to the mobile receiver. This software provider
may, in practice, be the same entity as the broadcaster; alternatively it may
be a third party broker who provides the application, AC , to the receiver.
The mobile user needs to be aware of which software provider can deliver the
application, AC . He may be informed of this by either the broadcaster or the
software provider. The mobile receiver is therefore in a position to download
AC from the software provider and descramble the broadcast service, subject
to the appropriate commercial agreements.
4.1.2 Assumptions about M
We assume the presence of a TPM as described in version 1.2 of the TCG
specifications. We also assume the presence of chipset extensions which al-
low memory protection to prevent physical attacks via DMA, and we assume
the presence of an isolation kernel. Thus the mobile receiver M can support
multiple execution environments or system partitions. Within a protected
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partition, applications may run in isolation, free from being observed or com-
promised by software running in any other partition. Trusted applications
running in the protected environment have access to the TPM.
Within this protected partition, a trusted broadcast application, AB, and
a trusted download application, AD execute upon a trusted operating system.
It is this protected environment into which the conditional access application,
AC , will be downloaded and executed.
The download application, AD, will perform two fundamental tasks. It
will complete one of the protocols described below. It will also prevent the
potential interference of any other application with AC while it is executing.
It may, for example, incorporate a monitoring function which adheres to a
specified policy, such that once the conditional access application is running
on the device, any attempt by another application to start up will fail; alter-
natively the start-up of any additional applications will result in AD stopping
AC , and erasing it from memory.
We assume that all secret keys required by the mobile receiver are pro-
tected by and are only accessible via the TPM.
A unique asymmetric encryption key pair, called the endorsement key
pair, is associated with the TPM. The private endorsement key is securely
stored in the TPM. The associated public key is certified, and the certificate
contains a general description of TPM and its security properties.
Credentials are generated indicating whether the particular design of
TPM in a particular class of mobile platform meets specified security re-
quirements, and whether a particular mobile host is an instance of this class
of mobile platform and incorporates a specific TPM which meets this design.
A private signing key is securely stored by the TPM. This key is used only
for entity authentication. The public signature verification key corresponding
to this private key is certified by a certification authority, CA. The certifi-
cate issued, CertTPM , binds the identity of the TPM (the trusted platform
containing the module) to a public key used for the verification of digital
signatures. This certificate must be obtainable by the software provider S.
The TPM is capable of generating an asymmetric encryption key pair,
where the public encryption key is signed/certified using the signature key
described above. This thwarts the privacy and security threats surrounding
routine use of the public asymmetric encryption key. The private decryption
key from this pair is bound to a particular environment configuration state.
4.1.3 Assumptions about S
We assume that the software provider, S, has a private signing key that is
securely stored within its environment and that this key is used only for
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entity authentication. We also assume that S, has a certificate, CertS, issued
by the certification authority, CA. This certificate associates the identity of
the S with a public key value for the verification of digital signatures. This
certificate must be available to, and verified by, the mobile platform, M .
Similarly, we assume that S is in possession of a valid CertTPM . Finally, we
assume that S is able to verify the claims made by the platform containing
a particular TPM. In other words, S is able to look up, or obtain from a
validation authority, an expected set of trustworthy integrity metrics.
4.2 Notation
The following notation is used in the specification of the protocols:
M denotes the mobile receiver
B denotes the broadcaster
S denotes the software provider
CA denotes a certification authority trusted by S and M
TPM denotes a TPM embedded in the mobile receiver M
AB denotes a trusted broadcast application
AC denotes the conditional access application which is
downloaded
AD denotes a trusted application/agent responsible for the
secure download of conditional access software
CertX is a public key certificate for entity X
KX,Y denotes a secret key possessed only by X and Y
RX is a random number issued by entity X
EK(Z) is the result of the symmetric encryption of data Z using
the key K
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SealI(Z) is the result of the encryption of data Z concatenated
with integrity metrics, I, such that Z can only be
deciphered and accessed if the software state of the
platform is consistent with I
H(Z) is a one-way hash function of data Z
MACK(Z) is a Message Authentication Code, generated on data Z
using key K
X(public) is the public asymmetric key of X
X(private) is the private asymmetric key of X
SX(Z) is the digital signature of data Z computed using entity
X’s private signature transformation
p is a prime number
g is a generator for Diffie-Hellman key exchange modulo p,
i.e. an element of multiplicative order q (a large prime
dividing p− 1) modulo p
aX is entity X’s Diffie-Hellman private key agreement
component
bX is entity X’s Diffie-Hellman public key key agreement
component = gaX mod p
X||Y is the result of the concatenation of data items X and Y
in that order
IdX is the identity of X
X → Y : Z indicates that message Z is sent from X to Y
4.3 TPM commands
We imply the use of the TPM command set and data structures as specified
by the TCG. TPM commands and data structures used in the protocols
include TPMCreateWrapKey, TPMCMKCreateKey, TPMCertifyKey, TPMQuote,
TPMSeal. We will also utilise the exclusive transport session mechanism, as
described in version 1.2 of the TCG specifications [8–10].
Commands for the public key protocol: The TPMCreateWrapKey
command is used in step 3 of the public key protocol to instruct the TPM to
generate the asymmetric key pair AD(public) and AD(private). The input
parameters associated with the TPMCreateWrapKey command include infor-
mation about the key to be created, e.g. key length, and authorisation data
necessary to access the parent wrapping key. Encrypted authorisation data
for the newly generated key pair may also be input if required.
For this particular use case we require that the key to be created is non-
migratable. This implies that the key cannot be migrated from the TPM in
which it is created.
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Alternatively, using a new command described in the TPM version 1.2
specifications, a certifiable migratable key may be created using the
TPMCMKCreateKey command. This creates a migratable key which may be
certified by the TPM and migrated only under strict controls. This prohibits
the key protecting the conditional access application from being migrated to
any random platform authorised by the TPM owner, but facilitates its mi-
gration to select devices, e.g. other TPMs owned by the same entity. Before
key migration, the key owner must authorise the migration transformation.
The migration destination must be authorised not only by the TPM owner
but also by a migration selection authority. This authority may, for example,
be the trusted download agent, AD. We will focus, however, on the case
where the key to be created is non-migratable.
In response to the TPMCreateWrapKey command, the TPM returns a
TPM Key data structure. This data structure contains AD(public), and the
encrypted private key, AD(private). The data structure also identifies the
operations permitted with the key, and contains flags to indicate whether or
not the key is migratable. The data structure may also identify the PCRs to
which AD(private) is bound, and may include the PCR digests at key creation
and the PCR digests required for key release. The PCR data provides the
integrity metrics, I, used in the protocols.
In our application, S will require that the returned PCR digest at cre-
ation reflects a trusted execution environment which consists of correctly
functioning broadcast and download applications running on a trusted oper-
ating system. The required PCR digest at release could be inserted by AD as
an an input parameter to the TPMCreateWrapKey command. Verification of
the returned PCR digest at creation (reflecting correctly functioning AB and
AD running on the trusted operating system) would ensure that all protocol
steps, and the value input by AD as the digest at release, can be trusted to be
correct. The value input into the digest at release by AD should be checked
by S before AC is dispatched.
The PCR digest at release could also reflect a state in which a particular
operating system, a particular video player, and a particular download appli-
cation, are running, but nothing more. The PCR values describe the state of
the execution environment at key creation and that required for key release.
However, if this data is to be communicated to the challenger, S, proof must
exist that the data originated from a genuine TPM and that it has not been
replayed. This is discussed below.
The final part of the TPM Key structure to consider is the
TPM Auth Data Usage field. This field may take on one of the following val-
ues: TPM Auth Never ; TPM Auth Always ; or TPM Auth Priv Use Only.
In our scenario, it is AD that must access the private key to decipher AC .
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The first option is to permit AD to load the private key without the submis-
sion of any authorisation data. In this case the TPM Auth Data Usage field
is set to TPM Auth Never. Alternatively, the TPM Auth Data Usage field
could be set to TPM Auth Always or TPM Auth Priv Use Only, where, on
key pair generation, 20 bytes of authorisation data are associated with the
public/private key pair, or with just the private decryption key, respectively.
To facilitate this, before a request for key pair generation, AD could re-
quest that the user provides a password, from which the authorisation data
for private key use would be derived. Thus, when access to the private de-
cryption key is required, the correct password would have to be re-entered
by the user. This option is acceptable provided that user interaction with
AC is feasible.
Once a key pair has been created using the TPMCreateWrapKey com-
mand, the handle associated with this key can be given to the TPM in a
TPMCertifyKey command. 160 bits of externally supplied data which, in this
protocol, is used to submit a one way hash of RS, and IdS may also be given
as an input parameter to this command. In response, the TPM returns a
TPM Certify Info data structure. This structure describes the key that was
created, including authorisation data requirements, a digest of the public key,
and a description of how the PCR data is used. In addition to this struc-
ture, the TPM also signs and returns a hash of the public key digest, the
160 bits of external data, and the PCR data contained in TPM Certify Info,
respectively.
Commands for Secret key protocol: For the secret key protocol de-
fined in section 4.6, the TPM exclusive transport session feature is required.
Any application can request the establishment of an exclusive transport ses-
sion with the TPM. Once an exclusive transport session has been established,
any TPM command made from outside the application will result in that ex-
clusive session being terminated. Any changes to the platform configuration
automatically raise a TPMExtend command to update the PCRs. Therefore,
once an exclusive transport session has started, any alteration of the plat-
form state will result in a premature termination of the session, which is
detected by the application that established it. This feature is used in step
3 of the following protocol in order to ensure that the platform state cannot
be changed after the agreed keys have been sealed.
The TPMSeal command is used in step 4 to store the keys K1S,AD and
K2S,AD in protected memory. The parameters taken by this command in-
clude the data to be sealed, and the authorisation data necessary to unseal
the data. The TPMSeal command is also given information identifying the
PCRs whose value is to be bound to the protected data. In response, the
TPM returns a TPM Stored Data structure. Specifically, this data struc-
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ture contains a reference to the PCRs that the data is bound to, and a
TPM Sealed Data structure. The latter contains the encrypted data and
the authorisation requirements to access the data.
For this particular use case we require that the key used in the seal opera-
tion is non-migratable. This implies that the private key cannot be migrated
from the TPM in which it is created.
Alternatively, using a new command described in the TPM version 1.2
specifications, a certifiable migratable key, created with the TPMCMKCreateKey
command, may be used in the seal operation. This migratable key may be
certified by the TPM and migrated, but only under strict controls. This
prohibits the sealing key, which essentially protects the conditional access
application, from being migrated to any random platform authorised by the
TPM owner, but facilitates its migration to select devices, e.g. other TPMs
owned by the same entity. We will focus, however, on the case where the
sealing key is non-migratable.
Finally, the TPMQuote command instructs the TPM to attest to the plat-
form configuration. The parameters given to this command include the in-
dices of the PCRs defining the platform integrity metrics, I. The TPMQuote
command may also be given 160 bits of externally supplied data which, in this
protocol, is used to submit a one way hash of bM , bS and IdS for attestation.
4.4 Protocol initiation
Both protocols begin when the user makes a request to the broadcast applica-
tion, AB, to view a specific video broadcast. If reception of this broadcast is
controlled by a particular conditional access application, AC , then AB checks
to see if the mobile device already has dedicated hardware or software in-
stalled to support AC . If no dedicated hardware exists on the mobile device,
then AB determines whether AC has previously been downloaded, and is still
available in secure storage. If so, the download application, AD, is called to
retrieve AC from secure storage and execute the application. If AC is not
available on the mobile device, then AD is called to download the application
which can be accomplished by deploying one of the following two protocols.
One of the two protocols below are completed every time a conditional
access application is to be downloaded. Thus, either the asymmetric encryp-
tion key pair generated in the public key protocol or the Diffie-Hellman key
agreed in the secret key protocol are unique to each protocol run.
4.5 Public key protocol
The protocol is illustrated in Fig. 5 and described in the following.
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1. AD → S : Request for AC
2. S → AD : RS
3. AD → TPM : TPMCreateWrapKey
4. TPM → AD : TPMKey
5. AD → TPM : TPMCertifyKey
6. TPM → AD :
TPM Certify Info ‖ STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I )
7. AD → S :
RS || IdS || TPMKey || TPM Certify Info
‖ STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I )
S now verifies the signature on the data received,
STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I ), checks RS to ensure the message
has not been replayed and IdS to ensure that the message was destined
for S. Assuming that the signature, nonce, and IdS are correct, S then
verifies the integrity metrics, I. If I describes a trustworthy platform, then
S generates K1S,AD used for data encryption, and K2S,AD used for data
integrity protection.
8. S → AD :
EAD(public)(K1S,AD‖K2S,AD) || SS(EAD(public)(K1S,AD‖K2S,AD))
|| EK1S,AD (MACK2S,AD (AC))
On receipt of the above message, AD verifies
SS(EAD(public)(K1S,AD‖K2S,AD)) and if the signature is valid, instructs the
TPM to decipher EAD(public)(K1S,AD‖K2S,AD). AD then deciphers
EK1S,AD (MACK2S,AD (AC)) and verifies MACK2S,AD (AC). Once the MAC is
verified, the application can be executed. During execution, AD precludes the
potential interference of any other application with AC , and after execution
AD deletes AC , and all other keys, when they are no longer required. The
encrypted copy of AC may remain stored for future use, space permitting.
4.6 Secret key protocol
The second protocol outlined below uses symmetric encryption as opposed
to asymmetric techniques. In this protocol, the software provider’s certifi-
cate, CertS, contains public Diffie-Hellman parameters g and p, and each
protocol runs begins with AD choosing a Diffie-Hellman private value aM
and calculating bM based on g and p which are retrieved from CertS.
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Figure 5: Public key protocol
1. AD → S : Request for AC || bM
On receipt of this message S chooses a new Diffie-Hellman private value
aS, and calculates bS using g and p.
2. S → AD : bS || SS(bS || bM || IdM)
AD then verifies the signature on the message received and calculates the
shared key KS,AD . This key is then used to derive, by an agreed method,
K1S,AD which will be used for data encryption and K2S,AD which will be
used for data integrity protection.
3. AD → TPM :
Request for exclusive transport session.
4. AD → TPM : TPMSealI (K1S,AD‖K2S,AD)
5. AD → TPM : TPMQuote(H(bM || bS || IdS))
6. TPM → AD : STPM(H(bM || bS || IdS) || I)
7. AD → S : STPM(H(bM || bS || IdS) || I)
S then verifies the signature on the data received,
STPM(H(bM || bS || IdS) || I), and verifies H(bM || bS || IdS) to ensure the
message is fresh and was destined for S. S then decides if I represents a
sufficiently trustworthy state. Given I, S can verify that the AD is executing
as expected, that it has not been tampered with, and that there is also a
legitimate broadcast application executing on the mobile host. Thus S can
be sure that an exclusive transport session has been set up between AD and
the TPM, and be confident that K1S,AD and K2S,AD have been sealed to the
PCR data defined by I. S then calculates KS,AD and derives K1S,AD and
K2S,AD by the agreed method.
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8. S → AD : EK1S,AD (MACK2S,AD (AC))
On receipt of the above message, AD, instructs the TPM to unsealK1S,AD
and K2S,AD . The TPM can only unseal K1S,AD and K2S,AD if the platform
is in the agreed state. Furthermore, authorisation data may also be required
depending on the parameters set when sealing the symmetric keys in step 4.
Once the keys are unsealed, AD may then decipher EK1S,AD (MACK2S,AD (AC))
and verify the MAC. If the MAC verifies correctly, the application is then
executed. During execution, AD precludes the potential interference of any
other application with AC . After execution, AD deletes AC , and all keys. The
encrypted copy of AC may remain stored for future use, space permitting.
5 General security analysis: Secure transmis-
sion
We initially examine both protocols with respect to our first objective: pro-
tection of the confidentiality and integrity of the application as it is trans-
ported from the software provider to the host platform.
5.1 Public key protocol
Confidentiality: Symmetric encryption is deployed to protect the confiden-
tiality of the AC . The symmetric key is securely transported to the mobile
host under a public encryption key of an asymmetric key pair. This key pair
is inextricably linked to the requesting trusted mobile host where the private
decryption key is securely stored. Assuming that the keys are securely man-
aged by the software provider, an attacker cannot intercept and gain read
access to the conditional access application unless there is a hardware-based
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attack on the mobile host. This would require the extraction of the private
decryption key from the TPM.
Integrity: A message authentication code is deployed to protect the in-
tegrity of AC in transit. The MAC key is protected by the same technique
used to protect the symmetric encryption key, described above. Thus, as-
suming secure MAC algorithms are used, integrity protection depends on the
security of the tamper proof TPM.
Entity authentication: The software provider can verify the identity of
the TPM and the state of the protected execution environment which utilises
TPM security services, via the platform attestation mechanism. That is, the
signature of the TPM on RS, IdS and on the integrity metrics representing
the protected execution environment guarantees the platform’s state and al-
lows the software provider to authenticate the trusted platform. Step 2 and
step 7 of the above protocol conform to the two pass unilateral authentica-
tion protocol described in clause 5.1.2 of ISO/IEC 9798-3:1998 [25], where
AD(public) serves as the nonce in the response message sent by M by virtue
of the fact that the asymmetric key pair is generated for each protocol run.
It may be argued that the protocol outlined above also provides entity au-
thentication with respect to the software provider. Since a unique AD(public)
is generated for each protocol run, AD(public) acts as not only a random
nonce but also represents the identity of the destination platform. The sig-
nature of the software provider on the unique public key, AD(public), provides
entity authentication.
Alternatively, one of the following additions may be made to the protocol.
A random nonce may be included in the signed bundle sent to the software
provider in step 7 and returned in conjunction with RS and IdM in the bundle
signed by the software provider in step 8. If this modification is made to the
protocol, steps 2, 7, and 8 conform to the three pass mutual authentication
protocol described in clause 5.2.2 of ISO/IEC 9798-3:1998 [25].
Instead of this, a timestamp, in conjunction with the IdM , could be in-
cluded in the signed bundle from step 8. If this modification was made step 8
would conform to the one pass unilateral authentication protocol as described
in clause 5.1.1 of ISO/IEC 9798-3:1998 [25].
Origin authentication: Since S signs K1S,AD and K2S,AD , M is able
to verify that these keys have been sent from S. Also, since K2S,AD is used
to compute the MAC, M can thus verify that the AC has been sent from
the same source. An attacker attempting to deliver a malicious application
would require the collaboration of S.
Replay: Platform attestation using the integrity metrics proves that
the platform is in a specific configuration, and that S is communicating
with a particular trusted module. This is only useful if proof exists that
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communications are fresh. This is accomplished by including RS in the signed
bundle sent to S in step 7.
It may be possible for an attacker to replace the message in step 8 with
an older message destined for the same mobile host, or with a correspond-
ing message destined for a different mobile host. However, since a unique
AD(public) is generated for each protocol run, the verification of the MAC
at the end of the protocol would detect this.
To detect replay earlier, a random nonce may be included in the signed
bundle sent to the software provider in step 7 and returned in the bundle
signed by the software provider in step 8. Alternatively, a timestamp could
be included in the signed bundle in step 8.
5.2 Secret key protocol
Confidentiality: As was the case in the first protocol, symmetric cryp-
tography is deployed to protect the confidentiality of the conditional access
application. However, rather than using the public encryption key of the
mobile host to securely transport the symmetric keys, authenticated Diffie-
Hellman is used to agree upon a symmetric key. Since key agreement is
authenticated, this protocol is safe from man in the middle attacks during
the key agreement process.
Integrity: As was the case in the first protocol a message authenti-
cation code is deployed in order to protect the integrity of the conditional
application in transit, where the MAC key is agreed using an authenticated
Diffie-Hellman protocol [26].
Entity authentication: As this protocol is based on the station-to-
station protocol [26](a type of authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol) it offers
mutual authentication. The software provider can verify the identity of the
TPM and the state of the protected execution environment which utilises
TPM security services. This may be accomplished via the platform attesta-
tion mechanism, i.e. the verification of the TPM ′s signature upon bM , bS,
IdS and the integrity metrics representative of the protected execution envi-
ronment. The mobile device can authenticate the software provider identity
via the verification of the digital signature which has been generated over bS,
bM and IdM .
Origin authentication: Since S signs bM and bS in step 2, and AC is
protected by using keys derived from bM and bS, then M is able to verify
the origin of AC . As before, an attacker attempting to deliver a malicious
application would require collaboration from S.
Replay: The inclusion of a unique, freshly generated bS in step 2 prevents
an attacker from blocking the message in step 7 and sending an older version
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captured from a previous protocol run.
The attacker could replace the message in step 8 with an older message
destined for the same mobile host, or with a corresponding message destined
for a different mobile host. However, since a unique KS,AD is generated for
each protocol run, verification of the MAC at the end of the protocol would
detect this. As additional measure, if deemed necessary, a timestamp may
be integrated into step 8 to prevent replay.
6 General security analysis: Secure execu-
tion
We now examine both protocols with respect to our second objective, namely
protection of the application when it reaches the host platform. Both pro-
tocols are the same in this respect, and rely on the security mechanisms
deployed by the trusted platform. Our analysis considers the confidentiality
and integrity protection of the application and on the host and the preven-
tion of unauthorised access to the application while in storage, and during
execution.
Security in storage: The confidentiality and the integrity of the appli-
cation while in storage on the mobile platform are protected via the same
mechanisms used to protect the application in transit: MACing and sym-
metric encryption.
In the public key protocol, these MACing and encryption keys are en-
crypted under a public key, where the corresponding private decryption key
is securely stored by the TPM and is non-migratable.
If either the encrypted and MACed application or the encrypted MACing
and encryption keys are captured, they will remain privacy protected due to
encryption. If, on the other hand, either the encrypted and MACed applica-
tion or the encrypted MACing and encryption keys are modified, the MAC
upon the application will fail.
In order to prevent unauthorised access to the private decryption key,
two further measures may be taken. The private decryption key may be
bound to a specific execution environment state such that this key may not
be loaded until the current environment configuration matches that to which
the private key is bound.
In conjunction with this, twenty bytes of authorisation data may be stored
with the private decryption key. However, a problem arises regarding where
this authorisation data may be stored. It may be securely stored by the TPM,
i.e. encrypted and bound to a specific execution environment but this offers
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no additional protection than if the first access control mechanism described
above is used in isolation. This is an important issue, but one that is not
dealt with in the TCG specifications.
Nevertheless, as an alternative option, it may be relatively straightforward
for a user to provide the necessary password, during key pair generation, from
which authorisation data is derived. This option may be acceptable so long
as user interaction with AD is permitted and there is a secure link between
the user entering the password and the TPM.
In the secret key protocol, the MACing and encryption keys are directly
encrypted by the TPM and bound to a specific execution environment state
(sealed). Twenty bytes of authorisation data may also be associated with
the sealed MACing and encryption keys for more stringent control against
unauthorised access.
No integrity mechanisms are offered by the TPM-protected storage func-
tionality. However, if the encrypted MACing and encryption keys are modi-
fied, the MAC on the application will not be verifiable.
Security during execution: The NGSCB architecture facilitates sys-
tem partitioning through the implementation of an isolation kernel which
then exposes the original hardware to one guest OS. This system partition-
ing also enables simpler PCR verification, as the number of applications
running on a trusted operating system in a particular protected execution
environment may be strictly controlled. With respect to memory partition-
ing, the NGSCB isolation kernel uses an algorithm called PTEC to partition
physical memory among guests. This is described in further detail in [18] but
from a security perspective, protection is analogous to that of traditional vir-
tual memory protection methods such as those that use translation lookaside
buffers or page tables.
To facilitate efficient implementation of parallel environments, a new CPU
mode has been introduced such that the isolation kernel may run in a new
ring -1, and guest operating systems can still execute in ring 0. This avoids
problems in relation to the virtualisability of particular OS instruction sets
which may arise if a virtual machine monitor were to be deployed in ring 0.
The memory protection mechanisms described above, while protecting
the application during execution, offer no protection against an attacker at-
tempting to subvert or bypass the operating system kernel via DMA. Such
an attack could lead to the execution of malicious code that has not been
recorded in the PCRs, or alternatively bypass virtual memory protections,
described above. To prevent this type of attack, Microsoft have encouraged
chipset manufacturers to make certain changes to the hardware. An access
control policy map is then defined by software (for example the isolation ker-
nel) and stored in main memory. This policy map then indicates whether
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a particular subject (DMA device) should be able to access (read or write)
to a particular resource (physical address). This policy map is enforced by
hardware.
Within the protected environment, where AB, AD and AC execute, AD,
as defined, will also prevent the potential interference of any other appli-
cation with AC while it is executing. AD may, for example, incorporate
a monitoring function which adheres to a specified policy, such that once
the conditional access application is running on the device, any attempt by
another application to start up will fail. Alternatively the start-up of any
additional applications will result in AD stopping AC , and erasing it from
memory. Once the application has run, it is either deleted or the encrypted
copy is stored for future use. Recovery of AC from encrypted storage would
require extraction of the keys from the TPM.
7 Formal analysis
Our protocols are conceptually simple: they consist of a challenge-response
message exchange followed by the transmission of the (encrypted and MACed)
application. Nonetheless, experience has shown that even simple protocols
can harbour subtle errors, and we must be careful in using informal argu-
ments to justify their correctness. In this section we outline a formal analysis
that has been carried out to establish that the protocols satisfy their primary
security goal. Full details of this analysis can be found in a University of Sur-
rey technical report [27].
7.1 Analysis approach
Our analysis uses an established formal verification technique, first described
by Schneider [28], based on a process algebraic model of the protocol. There
are three components to the approach:
• The protocol is captured in the process algebra Communicating Sequen-
tial Processes (CSP) [29] in terms of the behaviour of each participating
agent.
• The environment is also described as a CSP process. This is generally
an unreliable medium which may lose, reorder or duplicate messages.
• Requirements on the protocol are expressed as a specification of the
observable behaviour of the system.
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When these three components are brought together, well established proof-
techniques can be brought to bear on the task of proving that the model
satisfies the requirements of the protocol. In the next section we briefly state
some modelling assumptions and justify some simplifications we have made in
modelling the protocols. We then give a high-level description of our protocol
model, introduce our formalisation of the attestation property and explain
how the concept of a rank function can be used to prove that the protocols
meet their attestation goal.
7.2 Simplifying assumptions
Devising the CSP model of the protocols has motivated us to make several
simplifying assumptions to the protocols. For example, we assume that each
mobile device has access to a single TPM and is running a single instance of
the download application. We further assume that the attacker has access
to a single TPM. Although this is a limitation on our intruder model it is
not immediately clear whether allowing the intruder access to further trusted
platforms affords him any greater powers. Further work is needed to confirm
this.
Our model of the functionality of the trusted platform is both abstract and
limited. For example, we model just the TPM operations that are required by
the protocols. This results in a rather strong assumption that the intruder
cannot not use any further TPM operations to gain an advantage. This
assumption is strong because recent work has shown that security conditions
can violated via legal, but unexpected, calls to a security API [30]. The
assumption is reasonable, however, since our goal here is to reason about the
correctness of the protocols in the presence of a ‘perfect’ trusted platform.
This approach can be viewed as a first step to a deeper analysis which would
look at the protocols in the context of a wider variety of platform behaviour.
Arguably, it would be imprudent to attempt such an analysis by hand.
We assume that the integrity metric reported by a TPM is represented
by an atomic message component, I, and that, on receipt of the attestation
message, the software provider can make use of a publicly known function
validate(I) to determine whether or not I is indicative of a trusted platform
in a safe state. Both protocols demand that the platform state remains un-
changed between key generation and association of these keys with I, and
platform attestation. In the public key protocol, key generation and associ-
ation with I, and attestation is an atomic operation, whereas the secret key
protocol makes use of the exclusive transport session to ensure that the state
remains unchanged. It is possible to model this behaviour in CSP with an
interrupt that fires whenever a change of state is detected, effectively abort-
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ing the protocol. However, this seems unnecessary. Instead, we model the
platform by a recursive process that may engage in a run, and on completion
of that run, engage in a further run. Each platform may therefore be engaged
in at most one protocol run at any given time. The software provider may,
of course, run arbitrarily many protocol instances concurrently.
7.3 Modeling the protocols
7.3.1 The attacker
The capabilities of the attacker are based on the Dolev-Yao model [31] in
which the attacker is in complete control of (and, to all intents and purposes,
replaces) the network. All messages sent by honest agents are intercepted
by the attacker who may choose to send them on to their intended recipient,
but may also decide to block the message, redirect it, or save it for later
use. The network is composed of a number of honest agents (representing
mobile devices) and a single software provider. Agents transmit messages
on the communication channel trans and receive messages on the channel
rec. The event trans.i.j.m represents agent i’s transmission of a message
m intended for j. Similarly, rec.j.i.m represents the reception of message m
by j, apparently (but not necessarily) from i. This network arrangement is
given in Figure 7.
The attacker’s behaviour is bounded by the assumption of perfect encryp-
tion: he may only encrypt and decrypt messages if he possesses the appropri-
ate key. He cannot, for example, decrypt arbitrary data. The attacker’s store
of knowledge is represented by a set F such that he knows a fact f precisely
when f ∈ F . The attacker’s deduction of new facts from facts he already
knows is represented by the generates relation ⊢, such that F ⊢ m means
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that the attacker can deduce the fact m if he knows all the facts in the set
F . We extend the capabilities of the intruder based on the assumption that
he has access to an uncompromised trusted platform. Crucially, this trusted
platform will never be in a state that can convince a software provider to send
AC . We allow the attacker to run precisely the TPM commands of which
the protocols makes use. Consider, for example, our model of the TPMQuote
operation:
TPM Quote
F ⊢ H(bM ‖ bS ‖ idS)
F ⊢ STPM(H(bM ‖ bS ‖ idS) ‖ I)
(validate(I) = False)
This states that an attacker in possession of a message H(bM ‖ bS ‖ idS)
can deduce the message STPM(H(bM ‖ bS ‖ idS) ‖ I) — the attestation
message — where the side condition ensures that I is an integrity metric
representing an unsafe platform .
7.4 Formalising the notion of attestation
The main security goal of the protocols is to ensure that an application AC
is only be retrievable from a software provider S by the agent AD if AD
has previously proven its trustworthiness to S (in the case of the public key
protocol, by using the nonce RS). More formally we have:
If the server S completes a run of the protocol, apparently with
AD, using data items RS and AC , then the TPM has previously
attested its trustworthiness in a run of the protocol, taking the
role of initiator, using the same data items RS and AC , and fur-
ther each such run of S corresponds to a unique run of AD.
Viewed in this way, attestation is a form of injective agreement [32] and we
can model such claims using correspondence assertions. Briefly, if, on receipt
of a valid attestation from AD containing nonce RS, S signals that he believes
AD to be trustworthy (by performing the signal event
signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS .AC) then we can check that the presence of this
signal implies that a message was previously sent, by AD, that included both
RS and a valid attestation.
For a download application AD, this attestation consists of a message:
trans.AD.S.STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I )
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with I such that validate(I) = True. We formalise the attestation goal as a
predicate over the observable behaviour of the system:
{trans.AD.S.STPM(H(AD(public))||H(RS||IdS)||I)}
precedes
{signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS.AC}
A CSP protocol model will satisfy this predicate if, whenever the event
signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS.AC
is observed, the event
trans.AD.S.STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I )
(where validate(I) = True) has previously been observed.
Moreover, if we block the process representing AD from ever asserting its
trustworthiness, then the event signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS.AC should never
appear in the observable behaviour of the protocol model. If this condition
is met, we will be able to conclude that the attestation goal holds.
7.5 Rank function
In order to prove that the precedes predicate holds, we use the concept of
a rank function. The rank function is used to partition the message-space of
a protocol such that all messages which should remain secret are assigned a
rank of sec and all messages that might be public are assigned a rank of pub.
The central rank theorem [28] gives a series of healthiness conditions that the
function must satisfy in order for us to conclude that the protocol does actu-
ally maintain the secrecy of a given set of messages. Stated another way, the
rank theorem gives the conditions under which it is reasonable to conclude
that the sets of public and secret messages are disjoint; that there are no mes-
sages which the protocol makes public that we desire to keep secret. Given
the two sets {trans.AD.S.STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I )} and
{signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS.AC} the rank theorem tells us the following. If
we can find a rank function ρ with the following properties:
1. The attacker process, ENEMY , starts by only knowing messages of
rank pub.
2. If the attacker can perform the deduction F ⊢ m to learn the message
m from the set of messages F then m has a rank of pub whenever the
messages in F have a rank of pub.
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3. signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS.AC has a rank of sec.
4. If each of the protocol participants is blocked from ever sending the
message
STPM(H(AD(public)) || H(RS || IdS) || I ) then they never give out a
message of rank sec unless they have previously received a message of
rank sec.
then we can conclude that the precedes predicate holds of the protocol
model under consideration.
The formalisation and proof of this theorem can be found in [28]. Infor-
mally, conditions 1 and 2 tell us that an attacker cannot introduce a secret
message onto the network unless someone else has already told him a secret.
Condition 4 tells us that no users of the system can introduce a secret mes-
sage either. Thus, 1, 2 and 4 together allow us to deduce that no message
of rank sec can circulate in the system. Since, by condition 3, we know that
signal.T rustworthy.AD.RS .AC has a rank of sec we can conclude that this
message cannot therefore appear on the network, and that the attestation
goal holds.
The rank theorem poses the question: can we find such a rank function?
In fact, the answer to this question turns out to be yes. The full report on
this verification [27] details these rank functions and demonstrates that they
meet each of the four conditions of the central theorem.
7.6 Results
Each of the protocols reaches its attestation goal. However, it is worth con-
sidering whether this goal is achieved in a wholly transparent manner. Abadi
and Needham have given several principles for protocol design [33] and we
find that principle 10 is not satisfied by either protocol:
If an encoding is used to present the meaning of a message, then
it should be possible to tell which encoding is being used. In the
common case where the encoding is protocol dependent, it should
be possible to deduce that the message belongs to this protocol,
and in fact to a particular run of the protocol, and to know its
number in the protocol.
Consider the final protocol message:
SS(EAD(public)(K1S,AD , K2S,AD)) ‖ EK1S,AD (MACK2S,AD (AC))
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This message is only implicitly bound to a particular protocol run. Once
the software provider’s signature is verified, the agent is confronted with
the message component EAD(public)(K1S,AD , K2S,AD). It is feasible that this
message may have been replayed by the attacker from an earlier protocol
run, and it is only by using the decrypted MAC key to verify the MAC on
AC that the agent can discover whether this is the case. Such an assumption
is reasonable in our model since we assume that the user can determine
whether the decryption of a AC and verification of the MAC on AC succeeds.
Additional mechanisms may be deployed such that replay of the final message
can be detected earlier, as described in section 5.
Our analysis has shown that both of the protocol models meet the above
security goal. However, it should be borne in mind exactly what has been
achieved. Our protocol models are subject to the assumptions of perfect
encryption (an attacker can only decrypt messages to which he knows the
key), and other assumptions that place a bound on the behaviour of the
protocol agents and the attacker. These assumptions are detailed in [27].
Nonetheless, the results show that the protocol models satisfy their goal
when running on an unbounded network in which an arbitrary number of
protocol instances may be running concurrently. Although a formal proof of
correctness should not be mistaken as an unconditional proof, it is nonetheless
sufficient to inspire confidence that the design of the protocols is sound.
8 Conclusion
This paper identifies a challenge presented by the desire to use mobile devices
to receive broadcast content. Although existing standards may be applied to
meet this challenge, these standards were not designed with the requirements
of mobile devices in mind, and we suggest that a new approach is needed.
With this aim, we identify emerging technology that enables new solutions to
be developed and describe two potential solutions to the problem. The two
resulting protocols defined in this paper allow a mobile receiver to describe
its configuration to a software provider in a secure manner, and allow the
software provider to securely deliver a conditional access application to the
mobile receiver with confidence that the application will be protected on that
receiver.
An general analysis of the security of the proposed protocols is presented
followed by the results of a formal analysis that was carried out using CSP.
The results of the analysis suggest that the protocols will provide a secure
solution to the problem.
In developing the protocols we were motivated by a particular application,
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the secure delivery of broadcast content to mobile devices. However, it is clear
that the protocols described may be generalised and apply to a wider problem
space. Using these protocols, any application may be securely downloaded
to a mobile device with some degree of confidence that it will be protected
form malicious attacks during transmission, storage, and execution.
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